You may make a bomb out of used fuel, but it is non-trivial
Not all used nuclear fuel materials is well suited for bombs, especially the materials found in spent reactor fuel that has undergone an entire routine of use in a reactor. A variety of plutonium and uranium isotopes, the usual materials used to form the main of a nuclear warhead, are normally found in spent indivisible fuel. The issue is that they are quite difficult to separate your lives from the rest of the materials. It possible to do, but is not easy. Making a bomb out of used fuel is not a simple process. Current techniques require sizable infrastructure for refining the fuel and extracting the plutonium. This kind of is the sort of industry that the Combined Nations Security Council retains a close eye on in the world today. There are incredibly few international locations with the scientific and professional base necessary to build this sort of industry who do not curently have nuclear weapons or have decided to not create them. Handguards
This is certainly a point often missed by people who lobby against using nuclear power or nuclear fuel reprocessing. They just do not realize that a sizable part of the developed world has both the complex affluence and the available physical resources to create nuclear weapons and yet have chosen not to. The ‘nuclear club’, those nations who have got elemental weapons is merely consisting of The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, Chinese suppliers, India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Israel. Generally there are many wealthy international locations that own nuclear electricity plants who do not have nuclear weapons such as Canada, Germany, Asia, Finland, South Korea and many others. For the full list see Wikipedia’s article on Nuclear Electricity By Country. These countries have chosen to use their technical ability to produce prosperity rather than weaponry. This is important because these countries demonstrate that it is by no means a certainty that development of nuclear electric power technologies causes accessibility to weapons.
There will be more spent fuel to look after
This is true if the position quo regarding reprocessing goes on. With our current system of once-through fuel use for most nuclear reactors, the volume of used nuclear fuel will certainly increase. With increased amount of fuel comes increased difficulty in transport, basic safety, accounting, and security. Since more fuel is employed and goes into various varieties of storage, the opportunity a mistake will be made somewhere does go up. In short, it makes thefts of used nuclear fuel more likely.
Someone can steal the gas
So in the case that someone takes used fuel, they are going to still need to acquire usage of refining equipment if they would like to make a nuclear weapon. In order to get the used fuel to their equipment they would need to transport, most likely over quite a sizable distance, incredibly dangerous material. Atómico fuel has its own ‘features’ that make it extremely hard of taking. For starters, the developed world keeps a very close eye into it. The regulations about the safekeeping and transport of nuclear spend are quite stringent, and rightfully so. The developed world does not like the likelihood of common nuclear armaments. Used gas is a military property and it is usually very tightly watched by the militaries of the developed world.